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This paper documents and discusses a local labour control regime employed by 
Chinese crewing agencies to restrict mobility of newly graduated officer seafarers. The 
shipping industry relies on a stable and skilled seafarer workforce on flexible 
employment, assembled globally with the help of local crewing agencies. A stable 
workforce and flexible employment do not seem easily compatible. This paper 
examines how Chinese crewing agencies help manage this tension in China through 
analysing the experience of seafarers. It argues that to cater for the demand of 
international shipping companies, Chinese crewing agencies adopt a particular local 
labour control regime which re/produces unfree labour relations. The local control 
regime is built on existing institutional practices in China, structural weaknesses of 
seafarers, as well as the disjunctions between the local institutional setups and the 
global chains of labour supply.   
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Introduction 
Shipping is a global industry. To reduce costs, shipping companies routinely optimise 
their operations by spreading their businesses across several countries. Thus, it is a 
common practice that ship owners/managers from traditional maritime nations (e.g. 
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the UK, Germany, and Norway) register ships in Flag of Convenience countries (e.g. 
Panama and Liberia) and source seafarers from cheaper labour supply countries (e.g. 
the Philippines, China, India, and East European countries) on short-term employment 
contracts through local crewing agencies. This practice gives rise to a seafarer global 
labour market (ILO 2001). On the one hand, this labour market is characterised by 
flexible employment. On the other, ship managers strive to have a stable and skilled 
workforce for two reasons (Drewry 2006). First, seafarers are skilled workers and need 
to be well trained. Second, shipping is a safety critical industry and the seafarers 
already familiar with the safety management system of the company perform better. 
Unsurprisingly, the Shipping KPI (Key Performance Indicator) Standard initiated and 
implemented in the industry includes the retention rate of seafarers as a KPI.   
 
It seems rather contradictory to retain a stable and skilled workforce on temporary 
employment. This contradiction is particularly acute when the industry consistently 
reports a current, as well as projects a future, shortage of seafarer officers in the global 
labour market (BIMCO/ICS 2015). Since international ship managers have access to 
seafarers through a network of local crewing agencies, arguably, crewing agencies 
play an important role in assembling and managing a stable workforce to serve on the 
international fleet. It is through the agency’s mediation between the global market and 
local seafarers that global socio-economic activities are connected to and grounded in 
local institutional frameworks.  
 
This paper documents and discusses one strategy – unfree labour – adopted by 
Chinese crewing agencies to ‘retain’ newly qualified seafarer officers. The discussion 
draws on the concept of local labour control regime (Jonas 1996) as it captures the 
role of local institutions and dynamics in labour control in the local-global nexus 
(Davies et al. 2011; Riisgaard and Hammer 2011).  Through examining the experience 
of Chinese seafarers, this paper advances the argument that while the local control 
regime is built on the local institutional setups, it also takes advantage of the 
disjunctions between the local setups and the global chains of labour supply. This 
paper will also add to the literature on the links between unfree labour and 
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globalisation/neoliberalism (LeBaron and Ayers 2013; Morgan and Olsen 2014; 
Phillips and Mieres 2015),  
 
In the next section, we review the literature on labour control regimes and unfree 
labour. Following an introduction of the Chinese context, we explain the research 
methods and then present and discuss the research findings. We will conclude the 
paper by drawing out implications.  
 
Labour control regimes and unfree labour 
It is argued that labour control is an inherent imperative in capitalist production 
(Thompson and Vincent, 2010). For the purpose of cost reduction, production 
enhancement and thus profit maximisation, management has developed and 
implemented various strategies, such as early forms of direct, technical and 
bureaucratic control, and more recent normative control, neo-normative control, and 
computer control (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; Sturdy et al., 2010; Elliott and Long 
2016), to control the labour process. Labour control nevertheless takes place beyond 
the workplace and workplace social relations, and the concept of labour control 
regimes (Jonas 1996; Anner 2015) in various forms, such as factory regimes (Burawoy 
1985) and the dormitory labour regime (Smith and Pun 2006), is developed to account 
for the roles played by state policies and local socio-cultural and economic contexts in 
labour control. Being embedded in local settings, they are local labour control regimes 
(Jonas 1996). 
 
Labour control regimes deal with two aspects of labour power (Smith 2006; 2015): 
effort power – how much effort a worker puts into production cannot be determined by 
the employer, and mobility power – employers are uncertain to whom a worker would 
sell his/her labour power and for how long. Control of mobility power is largely outside 
of the workplace, but it is equally important. Without a stable workforce, production 
would not be possible (Azmeh 2014). In this context, research shows that low skilled 
temporary migrant workers are often immune from job-hopping because their visas 
are often conditional upon employment in a specific company (Kelly 2002; Strauss and 
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McGrath 2017). Azmeh (2014) compared the labour control regimes in the qualifying 
industrial zones (QIZ) of Egypt and Jordan and found that these zones were more 
successful in Jordan than in Egypt. The difference was largely due to labour mobility. 
QIZs in Egypt relied on domestic workers who could not be easily disciplined to meet 
the just-in-time production demands as they could choose to vote with their feet. 
Consequently, many Egyptian factories could not survive due to a lack of disciplined 
labour. By contrast, QIZs in Jordan largely relied on foreign workers whose passports 
were taken by their employers upon arrival. As such, these foreign workers could not 
leave the factories freely and were forced to work under poor working conditions and 
to meet the just-in-time production demands.  
 
Azmeh’s research (2014) points to the issue of unfree labour which overlaps with 
forced labour (ILO 2009; Morgan and Olsen 2014). While unfree labour takes various 
forms (McGrath 2013), its core features include: 1) not free to enter into alternative 
employment relations; 2) not free to exit current employment relations; 3) the terms 
and conditions of current work contributing to 1) and 2) (Lewis 2015; Olsen and 
Morgan 2015). Similarly, Phillips and Mieres (2015) point out that in the current era, 
unfree labour is commonly associated with the preclusion of exit which implies un-
freedom to enter alternative employment. The preclusion mechanisms include 
indebtedness (e.g. through overcharging for services such as accommodation, 
recruitment, and obtaining work permits), withholding wages, confiscation of 
documents or possessions, and manipulation of contracts (Phillips and Mieres 2015; 
LeBaron and Phillips 2018).  
 
Unfree labour is a global problem and according to the ILO (2009) report, tens and 
millions of people worldwide were its victims. This paper focuses on transnational 
workers. In the Global North, migration regimes governing transnational/migrant 
workers are often intertwined with unfree labour (LeBaron and Phillips 2018; Strauss 
and McGrath 2017; Yea and Chok 2018). First, immigration laws often bind low skilled 
temporary migrant workers to particular employers. If they want to change employers, 
they lose work permits. In this way, workers are deprived of mobility power. Second, 
to secure employment and immigration documents, temporary migrant workers rely 
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on labour intermediaries or recruitment agencies who charge high fees for the services 
and make workers victims of debt bondage (Barrientos 2013; LeBaron and Phillips 
2018; Olsen and Morgan 2015; Verité 2010). Thus, migration regimes and exploitative 
practices of labour intermediaries/employers co-produce unfree labour. Needless to 
say, unfree labour relations are produced in and contingent on the particular 
configurations of institutional policies and structural factors in local contexts (LeBaron 
and Phillips 2018; Yea and Chok 2018). In other words, a particular form of unfree 
labour reflects what Jonas (1996) termed as the local labour control regime.  
 
LeBaron and Phillips (2018: 6) argue that states ‘put in place the conditions in which 
individuals and groups of people become vulnerable to unfree labour, on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, the conditions in which these labour practices become feasible 
and coherent management practices…’. This argument rightly emphasises the role 
played by local institutional actors and policies. ‘States’ in this context refers to migrant 
labour receiving countries, and this body of literature uncover the important role played 
by the local labour control regimes involving migration policies of labour receiving 
countries and exploitative practices of labour intermediaries/employers.  
 
As transnational workers (Sampson 2013), seafarers work offshore, on foreign ships. 
They are different from immigrant workers working onshore who have been the focus 
of previous research – since migration policies for seafarers are relaxed in most 
countries (ILO 2001), migration regimes in foreign countries do not play a significant 
role in seafarers’ shipboard employment. As such, the local labour control regimes 
related to international seafarers would be different from those governing land-based 
migration labour. In this context, this paper examines a local labour control regime 
adopted by Chinese crewing agencies to restrict the mobility of seafarers. It shows 
that crewing agencies take advantage of institutional policies and practices in China, 
structural weaknesses of seafarers, as well as the disjunctions between the local 
institutional arrangements and the global chains of labour supply to create exit barriers. 
It demonstrates that in this case, the labour supply country (China) instead of labour 




More broadly, this paper is also situated in the debate of the links between unfree 
labour and neoliberalism. It is argued that in the contemporary world, unfree labour is 
underpinned by neoliberalism (LeBaron and Ayers 2013; Morgan and Olsen 2014), 
which pushes for labour market deregulation, open borders, and expansion of global 
production networks (GPNs). Labour market deregulation leads to the proliferation of 
precarious employment, undermines trade unions, and weakens labour protections. 
GPNs are characterised by long supply chains, outsourcing, and sub-contracting, with 
the aim to reduce (labour) costs. While GPNs incorporate more people into the global 
production system, Phillips and Mieres (2015) argue that in many cases, the cost 
reduction drive results in adverse incorporation. The word ‘adverse’ stresses that 
workers are incorporated into the system under the conditions of precarious 
employment and weak labour protections. Such adverse conditions facilitate the 
growth of unfree or forced labour, especially in developing countries where people are 
desperate for work and labour protection mechanisms are weak (Barrientos 2013; 
LeBaron and Ayers 2013). Low skilled migrant workers are also more likely to be 
adversely incorporated due to their vulnerable positions as discussed above.  
 
Though the GPN literature does not pay much attention to the shipping industry, this 
industry is nevertheless the bloodline of GPNs as it carries about 90 percent of the 
global trade. As mentioned in the beginning, the industry optimise its operations on a 
global scale to reduce costs. Such optimisation surely facilitates the expansion of 
GPNs. This paper will show that the optimisation may also facilitate unfree labour and 
thus contributes to the discussion of unfree labour and GPNs/neoliberalism.  
 
Chinese seafarers 
China has the largest seafarer population in the world (BIMCO/ICS 2015). According 
to the official statistics (MSA 2018), there were 394,059 registered foreign-going 
Chinese seafarers with valid certificates (as opposed to those work on the domestic 
trading fleet) by the end of 2017. In the same year, a total number of 27,301 people 




China has a big national fleet which is crewed by Chinese seafarers. At the same time, 
China is one of the largest seafarer suppliers to the international fleet, second only to 
the Philippines. According to the official statistics (MSA 2018), there were 224 Chinese 
crewing agencies serving foreign shipping companies and collectively they 
despatched 138,854 seafarers to work on foreign-flag vessels in 2017. 
 
Seafarer employment in China has undergone significant transformations over the last 
four decades or so (Wu et al. 2007). First, Chinese seafarers started to work on foreign 
ships in 1979, and the following decades witnessed a growing number of them 
deployed overseas. Second, the transition from a planned economy to a market one 
which started in the early 1980s opened the market for private shipping companies 
and crewing agencies to crop up and grow. As a result, employment of seafarers has 
been diversified. Third, when the employment market was monopolized by the state- 
or local government-owned shipping companies, Chinese seafarers were employed 
for life and their welfare was looked after by their employers. With the deepening of 
the market reform, seafarers’ employment was gradually changed to contract based. 
Thus, in the 1990s, seafarers working at state- or local government-owned shipping 
companies had permanent or long-term contracts, while those working for private ship 
owners and crewing agencies were likely to have medium-term contracts, five years, 
for example. At the same time, a group of ‘freelance’ seafarers also appeared in the 
labour market who secure employment through crewing agencies on contracts 
covering a tour of duty only. Freelance seafarers do not have incomes when they are 
not working on ships and their social insurance is arranged by themselves. By contrast, 
those on a medium-term contract with agencies may have a basic salary while on 
leave and their social insurance is covered by employers; and as a result, their working 
wage is likely to be lower compared with that of freelance seafarers because part of it 
is channelled to the basic salary and social insurance. Therefore, the employment of 
Chinese seafarers is no longer universally fixed for life to state-owned companies, and 
a range of employment practices co-exist today. This paper focuses on employment 






This research draws on two sources of data. The first one is discussing threads posted 
on seafarers’ online forums, and the second one is semi-structured interviews 
conducted with ex-seafarers. Both the authors are experienced researchers in 
seafarers’ rights and welfare, and have been regularly browsing discussion topics on 
Chinese seafarers’ online forums for over a decade. The online observation indicates 
one recurring theme, the practice of unfree labour in the crewing agencies in China. 
Among those threads, one was initiated by an ex-seafarer, Jia (pseudonym), and in 
this thread, Jia wrote a number of posts to provide a detailed account of the process 
he went through to quit from a crewing agency. Many seafarers contributed to the 
discussion by providing support to him, revealing their similar experiences, and 
seeking advice.  
 
The online discussion threads were nevertheless not produced for research and 
therefore they could not answer all the questions that the researchers might have. To 
explore some unanswered questions and complement the data collected online, the 
second author used his professional network and managed to find four ex-seafarers 
(with pseudonyms Yi, Bing, Ding, and Wu, respectively) who decided to leave the sea 
in their early seafaring career but encountered exit barriers set up by crewing agencies. 
They agreed to take part in interviews via emails due to distance. The email interviews 
afforded the informants more time to reflect on and elaborate their answers. To allow 
for interview probes and follow-up questions, the interviews were mainly conducted in 
two rounds. In the first round, the informants were asked to provide an account of their 
experience of exiting the employment with the crewing agencies. Their responses 
indicated that they were required to pay, and in the end they paid, a financial penalty 
to terminate the employment. In the second round, follow-up questions were asked 
regarding why crewing agencies requested a fee and why they chose to pay in the 
end instead of resolving the dispute through other means. To clarify a small number 
of issues, we contacted one of them again after the two rounds of interviews. 
 
The data were collected and thematically analysed in Chinese. Only the quotations in 




The offline cases 
China has a large number of maritime education and training (MET) universities and 
colleges, 78 by the end of 2017, and in the same year, they recruited 12,803 new 
student trainees (MSA 2018). Although MET students acquire different academic 
qualifications when they graduate, bachelor’s degrees or higher education diplomas 
or certificates, they all have to pass the standard officer qualification exams in the final 
year in order to obtain a provisional seafarer officer certificate. This certificate indicates 
that they have successfully completed the phase of shore-based training. To become 
a fully qualified officer and validate the provisional certificate, a student needs to have 
a minimum of 12 months at sea (as a cadet) for the phase of shipboard training. This 
arrangement is in compliance with The International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) which sets the 
international standards for seafarer training.    
 
After obtaining the provisional certificate, a student has two choices to gain sea time. 
One choice is to sign an employment contract with a shipping company or crewing 
agency who will send the student on a ship for a cadetship. The typical length of a 
contract is 60 months at sea. Another choice is not to sign an employment contract 
with any company, but to become a freelance seafarer. Surely, a freelance seafarer 
also needs to find job opportunities through crewing agencies, but does not need to 
sign an employment contract. In general, the majority of students would choose the 
first option as it guarantees employment. Without an employment contract, it is very 
difficult for a trainee to find a training ship. 
 
The four interviewees signed medium-term employment contracts with four crewing 
agencies located in four Chinese cities, with contract length ranging from sixty months 
at sea for Yi, Bing and Wu to ten calendar years for Ding.  In these contracts, one term 
was that if they prematurely terminate the employment, there would be a financial 
penalty for breach of contract. While Yi signed the contract without a second thought, 
Bing, Ding and Wu hesitated when being asked to sign. However, as the managers 
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threatened not to arrange shipboard training without signing the contract, they had no 
other choices.   
 
There were a few hidden strings attached to the employment contract. First, it is a 
common practice that once the contract is signed, the public record (Dang-An in 
Chinese) and in some cases the household registration (Hu-Kou in Chinese) of the 
student would be transferred from the MET institution to the employer.  In China, every 
student has a public record kept by the school recording his/her behaviour and 
performance at the school. This record is not open to the student, but follows him/her 
from primary school, high school to the university. Household registration is a 
residence permit issued by the government on a family basis. The benefits of social 
security are normally connected with this registration (Zhang, 2016). Upon graduation, 
these documents would be transferred to the employer to keep a record of his/her 
employment information. Second, once an employment contract is signed, only this 
employer can apply on the employee’s behalf to the maritime authority for the 
seaman’s book and other certificates, and the employee cannot do it himself/herself. 
In other words, a seafarer is attached to his/her employer by certificates, and without 
the employer’s consent, s/he cannot work for other crewing agencies. When the 
contract is terminated, the former employer will notify the maritime authority and the 
latter will then accept the application from a new employer on behalf of this seafarer. 
 
All the four informants wanted to terminate the employment with the agencies before 
completing the contract. Wu felt that a career at sea was not what he would like, and 
Bing and Ding found employment ashore while taking shore leaves, after about one 
year service at sea. In the third year of his employment with the crewing agency, Yi 
applied for postgraduate studies and obtained an offer. Inevitably, all of them faced 
the problem of breach of contract and were requested to pay a financial penalty 
ranging from RMB 30,000 to 60,000. The justification from the agencies was that they 
paid the MET institutions a fee when recruiting student trainees and that they had also 
provided training.  Nevertheless, the agencies did not tell the informants the amount 
they paid to the MET institutions. According to the Labour Contract Law in China, if 
the employer provides training for an employee, the employer can have an agreement 
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with the employee on the length of service period and require the employee to pay a 
financial penalty if the agreement is violated; but the penalty should not exceed the 
pro rata training costs.  
 
Without paying this penalty, the managers refused to terminate the contract and to 
return the public record and other documents, such as their household registration. 
Without the public record and household registration, there would be serious 
consequences as Yi explained: 
It would cause lots of troubles without the public record or household 
registration. Most employers require it before they could recruit you. Without it, 
it would cause lots of problems in the future as well when you need to find new 
employment, apply for professional certificates, arrange for social security, buy 
a house, and arrange your children’s schooling.  
 
As the agencies held the public record and other documents, the four informants 
decided to negotiate with them. After negotiation, they paid about half of the required 
penalty and successfully terminated the contracts. According to the informants, there 
were no standards for the penalty. The agencies did not explain to them how much 
they had spent on their recruitment and training. The negotiation was more like random 
bargaining. When asked about how they reached the agreed amount of penalty, Ding 
explained: 
They knew that I did not have much money. After all, I had only worked for one 
year at sea. They were also aware that I had made up my mind to quit this job. 
As such, they knew that they could not squeeze too much from me. From my 
side, I have my public record and other certificates in their hands. … They 
showed me the contract and I knew that I could not get away without paying a 
penalty fee. I felt lucky that the haggling reduced it to RMB20,000 from the initial 
RMB60,000.  
It seems that the amount of penalty rather depended on the managers’ estimation of 




For the informants, although they were reluctant to pay, they did not perceive any other 
alternatives. Although officially speaking Chinese workers are unionised under an 
official umbrella union organisation, namely All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), under the current Chinese political setup, the unions are generally regarded 
as window-dressing and found to be ineffective in representing workers when labour 
disputes occur (Chen 2007; Metcalf & Li 2005). The more recent industrial relations 
literature (Bieler and Lee 2016; Elfstom 2019; Fu 2017) nevertheless suggests that a 
number of labour NGOs are active in protecting labour rights and not afraid of 
organising workers for collective actions in the Pearl River Delta region – a major 
manufacturing centre in China. Understandably, labour NGOs focus more on 
manufacturing centres where there are large numbers of factory workers. Seafarers, 
however, are not concentrated in any particular location and they work offshore. As 
such, Chinese seafarers and labour NGOs may not be familiar with (or even aware of) 
each other. 
 
Regarding channels such as labour dispute arbitration or other legal means, the 
informants did not perceive to be viable. Yi and Ding elaborated on this point: 
I did not think about these channels, mainly because I did sign the contract 
which included the penalty clause. Also, I was not familiar with the law and 
wanted to settle the issue as quickly as possible. I did not want to drag it on. 
Furthermore, I consulted some friends and former colleagues and knew that 
they also paid a penalty when they quitted.  
 
I thought about legal means, but did not feel that it was viable. After all, an 
individual did not have the resources to fight with a company. Also, I did not 
have time to fight with them – I needed to get back my public record and 
certificates as soon as possible. I could not afford to drag it on.   
Wu nevertheless went to consult a lawyer. This was because he was sued by the 
company over refusing to pay the penalty. He was scared and went to consult a lawyer. 
The lawyer charged a consultation fee of RMB 300, but did not give much useful 
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information. As it would be very costly to engage the lawyer further in the case, Wu 
went to the company, negotiated with the managers, and reached an agreement to 
pay RMB 15,000 instead of the initially requested RMB 30,000.  He explained how 
they reached this agreement: 
Later I knew that some people paid more, up to RMB 20,000, while others paid 
less, about RMB 5,000. There was no standard and all depended on the 
managers. ‘Everybody has to pay. Otherwise, we would lose control.’ This was 
exactly what they told me. I offended them and therefore paid more. If I agreed 
to pay in the first place, I might be able to resolve it with RMB 5,000.  
Therefore, the rule is that even though the amount is negotiable, a seafarer has to pay 
a penalty to quit. If one did not pay, the company would have problems enforcing this 
rule in the future.  
 
The online cases 
The interview data indicated that it is a norm that a seafarer has to pay to leave a 
crewing agency within the contracted period – many of their colleagues and friends 
did so. As they perceived this practice to be common, the four interviewees did not go 
online to make a complaint, seek advice, or expose the unfair treatment they received. 
There are other seafarers who did so, however. A major Chinese seafarer online 
community called the Home to Chinese Seafarers has a dedicated discussion forum 
for seafarers to expose unfair practices of crewing agencies and warn other of such 
agencies. The authors browsed the first 200 discussion threads in this forum on 20th 
December 2017 and found that ten of them (5 per cent) were complaints related to 
unfree labour practices.  
 
Among these ten seafarers, Wang, a cadet who together with another 29 of his 
college-mates joined a crewing agency upon completing the shore-based training, 
made a complaint and warned the readers not to join this company: 
…The most scaring thing was that the ships they managed were not safe. The 
majority of those ships were second-hand. I heard that one of my college-mates 
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experienced three fire accidents in a month on his ship. … My college-mates 
were worried about safety and wanted to quit. But the company refused to let 
them go by holding their certificates and demanding RMB3,000 for 
compensation. For safety, more than ten of my college-mates have paid the 
compensation and left the company. I feel sorry for them. However, I am 
worried about my other college-mates who are still working on their ships.  
 
Another cadet, Yang, did not like the ship he was sent to either and made a complaint 
against the agency. He wrote that there was a lack of fresh water and food on that 
ship and that he toiled four months on the ship. He wanted to leave but the agency 
refused to give back his certificates. He continued to write: 
I went to the local Public Security Bureau and the local Labour Inspectorate to 
make a complaint. Also, I went to the news media to expose their misconduct.  
However, it was useless. They are too powerful. There is not much I can do 
apart from coming here to expose their behaviour to the seafaring community.  
 
It has been widely reported that in order not lose seafarers to competitors, Chinese 
crewing agencies resort to controlling seafarers’ certificates (Tang et al. 2016). The 
cases discussed so far in this paper has shown that agencies also make it difficult for 
seafarers to move ashore. While the reasons and implications will be discussed in the 
next section, what is already clear is that whether seafarers wished to leave one 
particular agency for another shipping company or wanted to move into a job ashore 
within the contract period, they found it difficult without paying a penalty. They were in 
a vulnerable position and did not have the resources to fight with a company; and even 
if they fought, they were likely to lose.  
 
There was one exception, however. Jia, who posted his experience in a different online 
forum, fought with the agency and refused to pay. As he went further on the road of 
resistance, his case revealed more exit barriers. Jia signed an employment contract 
with a crewing agency headquartered in Beijing, the length of which was 60 months at 
sea. Consequently, his public record and certificates were transferred to the crewing 
agency. After serving on one foreign ship as a cadet, however, he felt that a career at 
15 
 
sea was not for him, and therefore decided to quit. However, he was asked to pay a 
USD 6,000 (about RMB 40,000) penalty for premature contract termination. The 
reason given for this penalty was compensation for cadet training. Jia was infuriated 
by this request. He did not think that he should pay for this shipboard training because 
he was working on the ship as a trainee and took on-the-job training. As nobody else 
could help him, Jia studied the Labour Contract Law, other relevant laws, and the three 
contracts he had signed – the 60 months employment contract and the cadet 
shipboard training agreement with the agent as well as the tour-of-duty employment 
contract with the foreign shipping company. The study convinced him that the 
shipboard training was, in fact, an internship which did not incur any costs and should 
not be the ground for compensation.  
 
From his study, Jia also learned that he could make a complaint to the Labour 
Inspectorate in Beijing. However, he was aware that one of his friends made a similar 
complaint to the Labour Inspectorate once. In that case, the crewing agency argued 
that they had the training agreement with the trainee and that the foreign shipping 
company paid for the training. As the Labour Inspectorate had little experience or 
knowledge regarding seafaring jobs involving foreign shipping companies, this 
argument sounded reasonable to them and they could not see anything inappropriate 
in the conduct of the crewing agency. That case stopped there and then. Theoretically, 
the Labour Inspectorate or the involved seafarer could contact the involved foreign 
ship manager to check if they had indeed paid for any training. However, in practice, 
it was more problematic. Jia tried to establish contact with the foreign shipping 
company that he served and emailed them a few times but did not get any response. 
Furthermore, the crewing agency boasted that they had a good relationship with the 
Labour Inspectorate. Therefore Jia came to the conclusion that it was useless to make 
a complaint to the Labour Inspectorate. 
 
The next two institutions Jia considered were the Labour Dispute Arbitration 
Committee (LDAC) and China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC). In his 
employment contract, it was written that in case of any labour disputes, arbitration 
application can be made to CMAC Beijing. Furthermore, Jia wrote in a post: 
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According to Beijing LDAC, Beijing Labour Bureau stipulates that seafaring 
related labour disputes must be dealt with by CMAC. Why? Maybe this is 
because they think CMAC is more professional in dealing with this kind of 
disputes.  
However, Jia found that this was not the case. CMAC set up more barriers for access 
and was not necessarily more professional. Nevertheless, he made an arbitration 
application to CMAC. He continued in the post: 
On the official website of CMAC, it is made clear that they deal with admiralty, 
maritime, transport, and logistics-related disputes. Only at an inconspicuous 
place, it mentions that it also deals with seafarers’ labour disputes. … Let’s see 
the differences between the LDAC and CMAC. First … the LDAC is set up by 
the Labour Bureau to defend labour rights. In contrast, CMAC is established by 
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade to deal with 
international trade disputes. In this case, are they really competent in dealing 
with labour disputes and protecting labour rights? Second, the LDAC arbitration 
service is free for workers, but the CMAC arbitration fee starts from RMB 5,000 
depending on the value of the claim. For a worker, such service is expensive. 
Furthermore, an LDAC arbitration case can be concluded within a month, but a 
CMAC case takes three months to have the arbitration hearing.  Within this 
period, the worker is not able to find a job and work. It is a huge burden for the 
worker both financially and mentally. Third, the LDAC arbitrators have rich 
experience in dealing with labour disputes, but only one in Shanghai out of all 
the 200 or so CMAS arbitrators covers maritime related labour disputes. If I 
appointed him as the arbitrator, I would need to prepay all his travelling and 
accommodation costs. I could not afford that and had to accept the arbitrator 
appointed by CMAC who specialised in shipping insurance. I spent three hours 
explaining to him the case and the relevant regulations on this issue. … 
Fortunately, as aforementioned Jia studied the relevant laws and his contracts and 





In the arbitration process, the crewing agency argued that as trainees on ships were 
given and needed to complete the training record book issued by the Maritime Safety 
Administration (MSA), this training record book was evidence that they were taking 
training. As a response, Jia contacted the MSA to clarify this matter. The MSA official 
confirmed that although the word ‘training’ was on the record book, it was on-the-job 
training, not training that should be paid by trainees. In the end, Jia successfully 
terminated his contract without paying the penalty.  
 
The re/production and functions of the labour control regime 
The cases presented above reveal the multiple barriers seafarers face when they plan 
to terminate employment with agencies. The agencies hold seafarers’ public records 
and certificates for ransom. Seafarers either pay the money to terminate the contracts 
and get back the records and certificates or fight with the agencies through legal 
means. It is costly either way. Furthermore, the legal means can be risky as the result 
of the arbitration can go either way. If the seafarer does not have sufficient knowledge 
to inform the appointed arbitrator who may have limited knowledge and expertise in 
labour disputes, he/she may lose the case. A seafarer can also bring the dispute to a 
maritime court. Nevertheless, this again is costly in terms of both time and money 
without a guarantee of winning. Therefore it is not surprising that the majority of 
Chinese seafarers choose not to go through the legal channels. It is much faster and 
requires less effort to negotiate with the agencies and pay a financial penalty if they 
are determined to leave. After all, they need to settle the dispute quickly so that they 
could resume normal life and start a new job.  
 
These barriers result in unfree labour relations as they restrict seafarers’ freedom: 1) 
to enter into alternative employment; 2) to exit current employment; and 3) the terms 
and conditions of current work contributing to 1) and 2). Unlike in previous studies 
where labour brokers use straightforward debt bondage to curtail mobility (Barrientos 
2013; LeBaron and Phillips 2018; Olsen and Morgan 2015; Verité 2010), Chinese 
crewing agencies use contracts with conditional financial penalties. As Jia’s case 
suggests, the conditional penalties in these contracts may not be legal. But they are 
rarely challenged and largely function as intended by crewing agencies. The 
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‘theoretically illegal but practically functional’ status of the financial penalty 
arrangements reflect deficiencies in the institutional framework regarding employment 
and labour rights protection as well as structural weaknesses of seafarers.  In terms 
of structural weaknesses, seafarers are largely individualised without effective union 
or collective representation (Tang et al. 2016) and thus resource-less as opposed to 
crewing agencies. Institutional policies and practices afford the agencies the 
opportunity to take hold of seafarers’ public records and other documents for ransom. 
There are labour rights protection institutions including the Labour Inspectorate, the 
LDAC and CMAC. Theoretically, they form a safety net. But in practice, while the 
Labour Inspectorate and the LDAC may have expertise and experience in dealing with 
labour disputes, they lose competency when crewing agencies deliberately complicate 
the issue by bringing in a foreign employer. While CMAC has ‘maritime’ on its title, it 
mainly deals with commercial disputes. The safety net disintegrates in front of the 
global labour chains. The situation is made worse by the inaccessibility of foreign 
employers for any inquiries. Thus the global chains of labour supply significantly 
weaken the ability of local labour rights protection institutions.  
 
This penalty arrangement serves the interests of crewing agencies in two ways. 
Regarding seafarers who intend to continue working at sea, the contract binds them 
to the agency and it is difficult for them to hop agencies. Regarding those who do not 
want to continue, the binding contract serves to bring in income in the form of financial 
penalties. In fact, penalty collection is a lucrative side business for agencies. A study 
shows that less than 50 per cent of MET graduates with a bachelor’s degree would 
remain to work at sea for longer than five years (Yao et al. 2017), which indicates that 
a large number of seafarers would prematurely terminate their contracts and be 
required to pay a penalty. Even if crewing agencies are challenged by a determined 
seafarer, like Jia, and lose the case in arbitration or court, there is no real damage 
inflicted on them – they only need to terminate the contract with the seafarer and return 
his/her public record and certificates. One individual case would not stop the practice 




For foreign ship owners, the binding contract certainly helps with maintaining a cheap 
and yet stable workforce at sea. First, it serves to prevent seafarers from changing 
crewing agencies, and thus enables ship owners to control seafarers’ mobility through 
agencies. Second, although a big proportion of newly graduated seafarers would leave 
the sea and thus creates a problem of retention, the binding contract nevertheless 
allows crewing agencies to extract penalties. As the agencies benefit financially from 
the penalty, they could afford to offer the crewing services at a lower price. In other 
words, the penalty can subsidise the crewing services provided. Taken together, the 
binding contract allows crewing agencies to provide crewing services relatively cheap 
while at the same time keep a relatively stable pool of seafarers. In fact, research 
evidence suggests that Chinese crewing agencies have largely relied on the low-cost 
strategy to open and develop the global market (Tang et al. 2016; Wu et al. 2007).  
 
While Chinese agencies help manage the labour mobility at low costs, foreign ship 
managers take advantage of flexibility which allows them to adjust the supply of labour. 
If the market is bad and they manage fewer ships, the foreign employer has no 
responsibility to the surplus seafarers, and it is the crewing agency who has to find 
other employers for them. In fact, when the demand is low, many Chinese crewing 
agencies have the problem of surplus labour (Tang et al. 2016; Zhao et al. 2016). 
However, the consequence is borne mostly by seafarers – they have to wait for a long 
time to be dispatched onto a ship for work. When they are not working, they may not 
have income. According to the Labour Control Law in China, the agencies still have to 
pay for seafarers’ social insurance during the waiting period, but they will recover the 
costs from the seafarers’ salaries when they join the next ship. Therefore, the binding 
contract with a crewing agency does not lead to a stable income for seafarers, and the 
risks and consequences of the fluctuating demand are shifted from ship managers to 
crewing agencies and finally down to seafarers.  
 
More broadly, as the shipping industry is an integral part of GPNs, cheap seafaring 
labour also sustains GPNs. In this way, while Chinese seafarers are incorporated into 




It is necessary to add a caveat here. The binding contract only works on newly 
graduated officer seafarers who need shipboard training to validate their certificates. 
When they reach senior levels and have completed the initial contract, they are less 
likely to renew it with the agency. Many of them choose to become freelance seafarers 
instead.  
   
Conclusion 
This paper has documented and discussed a local labour control regime employed by 
Chinese crewing agencies to restrict the mobility of newly graduated officer seafarers. 
The key to this regime is a medium-term employment contract with a conditional 
financial penalty. If a seafarer wants to terminate the contract before its end, he/she 
would be requested to pay the financial penalty. While this penalty is largely illegal, it 
is likely to be functional from the perspective of the crewing agency because the 
seafarer may not have the resources or make the effort to challenge it. As a result, the 
seafarer either stays with the crewing agency for the contracted period or has to pay 
a financial penalty to leave. In effect, those who choose to leave subsidise the crewing 
agency to provide cheaper crewing services to foreign shipping companies with a 
relatively stable pool of remaining seafarers. The risks and costs of flexibility are thus 
transferred to seafarers, while the benefits of it are reaped by Chinese crewing 
agencies and international shipping companies. This is not to suggest that 
international shipping companies have taken part in designing this labour control 
regime. They may or may not be aware of it. However, they create a market demand 
for a cheap, flexible and yet retainable workforce. It is to cater for this demand that 
Chinese crewing agencies adopt this regime. This regime also benefits GPNs and 
GPNs adversely incorporate not only factory and agricultural workers as revealed by 
the existing literature, but also seafarers as this paper has demonstrated. 
   
This paper tells the story from the perspective of newly qualified seafarers, and we do 
not claim that this is the full story. Furthermore, the focus of this paper is narrowly on 
unfree labour, and arguably Chinese crewing agencies employ a range of strategies 
to control labour. To provide a comprehensive understanding of the labour control 
issue in relation to Chinese seafarers, more research is needed to include the 
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perspective of crewing agencies and a large sample of seafarers with a variety of 
experiences. Notwithstanding the limitations, this paper suggests that the interaction 
between the global labour chains and local institutional setups in labour supply 
countries serves to re/produce the local labour control regime. Cross-border labour 
supply chains make regulation application/enforcement problematic and significantly 
weakens the ability of local labour rights protection institutions. Thus, Chinese crewing 
agencies take advantage of not only existing institutional practices in China and 
structural weaknesses of seafarers but also the disjunctions between the local 
institutional arrangements and the global chains of labour supply to create exit barriers. 
This paper reveals that in various ways, the local control regime is intricately linked to 
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